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DIRECTOR-EXCULPATION CLAUSES UNDER THE
ARKANSAS BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT OF 1987
Frances Fendler Rosenzweig*
In the early 1980s, at the height of the merger and acquisition
activity of those rambunctious times, corporate America was faced
with a special type of insurance crisis. Insurers, reacting to the in-
creased litigation associated with corporate takeover activity, simply
quit selling liability insurance for officers and directors, reduced the
scope of coverage, or significantly raised their premiums and deduct-
ibles.' Then, in 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court-the most influen-
tial corporate law court-dropped a bombshell. In Smith v. Van
Gorkom,2 the court held that well-respected, prominent outside direc-
tors of Trans Union were personally liable for "gross negligence" for
* Associate Professor, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law. B.A. 1979,
J.D. 1982, University of Arkansas at Little Rock.
I. E.g., James J. Hanks, Jr. & Larry P. Scriggins, Let Stockholders Decide: The Origins of
the Maryland Director and Officer Liability Statute of 1988, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 235, 235-37
(1989); Donald E. Pease, Outside Directors: Their Importance to the Corporation and Protection
From Liability, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 25, 82-83 (1987); E. Norman Veasey et al., Delaware Sup-
ports Directors With a Three-Legged Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification and Insurance,
42 Bus. LAW. 399, 400-01 (1987).
2. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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approving a merger at what may have been an inadequate price.'
Spurred by predictions that Delaware corporations would no longer be
able to attract qualified directors, the Delaware legislature quickly re-
sponded by passing an amendment to its Corporation Code.4 Under
that amendment, Delaware corporations were permitted to adopt a di-
rector-exculpation clause - a charter clause that would limit or elimi-
nate the personal liability of corporate directors in cases like Smith v.
Van Gorkom.5
Arkansas, like many other states, followed Delaware's lead to try
to stem the tide of director liability suits. 6 The 1987 Arkansas Business
Corporation Act (1987 Act), while largely modelled on the 1986 ver-
sion of the American Bar Association's Revised Model Business Corpo-
ration Act ("RMBCA"), incorporated the Delaware approach author-
izing optional director-exculpation clauses in articles of incorporation
3. The Delaware court held that the Trans Union directors had breached their fiduciary
duties by approving, upon a mere two hours consideration, a cash-out merger without adequately
informing themselves about the intrinsic value of the company or about the controlling director's
role in forcing the sale and establishing the price. Id. at 874.
4. See Official Synopsis & Commentary to DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7), reprinted
in I E. FOLK ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 102.15 (3d ed.
1992); R. Franklin Balotti & Mark J. Gentile, Elimination or Limitation of Director Liability for
Delaware Corporations, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5, 6-11 (1987); Harvey Gelb, Director Due Care
Liability: An Assessment of the New Statutes, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 13, 23-24 (1988); Pease, supra
note I, at 90.
5. The Delaware statute provides, in pertinent part:
(b) [T]he certificate of incorporation may ... contain any or all of the following mat-
ters ...
(7) A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to
the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fidu-
ciary duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or
limit the liability of a director: (i) for any breach of the director's duty of
loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in
good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of
law; (iii) under section 174 of this title [Liability of Directors for Unlawful
Payment of Dividend or Unlawful Stock Purchase or Redemption]; or (iv)
for any transaction from which the director derived an improper personal
benefit. No such provision shall eliminate or limit the liability of a director
for any act or omission occurring prior to the date when such provision be-
comes effective.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991).
6. For discussions of legislative responses by other states, see, e.g., Gelb, supra note 4, at
28-46; James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer Liability
Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAW. 1207 (1988); Marc I. Steinberg, The Evisceration
of the Duty of Care, 42 Sw. L.J. 919 (1988); Jeffrey P. Weiss, The Effect of Director Liability
Statutes on Corporate Law and Policy, 14 J. CORP. L. 637 (1989).
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filed under the 1987 Act.' This article will analyze the Arkansas provi-
sion, describing the scope of the protection afforded corporate directors
in light of other Arkansas and federal law.
I. BACKGROUND - FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE
In Arkansas, as in other states, corporate directors are fiduciaries.'
As the Supreme Court of New York so elegantly put it over fifty years
ago,
It is clear that a director owes loyalty and allegiance to the com-
pany-a loyalty that is undivided and an allegiance that is influenced
in action by no consideration other than the welfare of the corpora-
tion. Any adverse interest of a director will be subjected to a scrutiny
rigid and uncompromising. He may not profit at the expense of his
corporation and in conflict with its rights; he may not for personal
gain divert unto himself the opportunities which in equity and fairness
belong to his corporation. He is required to use his independent judg-
ment. In the discharge of his duties a director must, of course, act
honestly and in good faith, but that is not enough. He must also exer-
cise some degree of skill and prudence and diligence.9
7. The 1987 Arkansas Business Corporation Act was the product of efforts by Arkansas
business leaders who believed that Arkansas corporations, to function effectively, needed the abil-
ity to protect their directors from potential liabilities of the sort imposed in Smith v. Van Gorkom.
In addition, these leaders believed that Arkansas' existing corporation act was too restrictive and
cumbersome and made it difficult for Arkansas corporations to take advantage of modern tech-
niques of corporate finance and corporate structuring. Accordingly, the Rose Law Firm of Little
Rock was retained to draft a new corporation act, and this draft eventually became the 1987 Act.
Interviews with David Knight, Esq., Rose Law Firm partner in charge of the drafting effort, Little
Rock, Arkansas (1986-87).
Ironically, if the business leaders had not moved so promptly, they might have been able to
persuade the Arkansas legislature to enact markedly broader protections for corporate directors.
On June 16, 1990, the American Bar Association's Committee on Corporate Laws amended sec-
tion 2.02 of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act to include an optional director-exculpa-
tion charter clause as RMBCA § 2.02(b)(4). 46 Bus. LAW. 319 (1990). The Revised Model Act
provision is more far-reaching than the Delaware/Arkansas provision. It permits a corporation to
include in its articles:
a provision eliminating or limiting the liability of a director to the corporation or its
shareholders for money damages for any action taken, or any failure to take any action,
as a director, except liability for (A) the amount of a financial benefit received by a
director to which he is not entitled; (B) an intentional infliction of harm on the corpora-
tion or the shareholders; (C) a violation of section 8.33 [concerning directors' liability
for unlawful distributions]; or (D) an intentional violation of criminal law.
See I MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANNOTATED § 2.02 (3d ed. 1990) [hereinafter MBCA ANN.].
8. See, e.g., Hall v. Staha, 303 Ark. 673, 681, 800 S.W.2d 396, 401 (1990).
9. Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 677-78 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
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The fiduciary duty of a director is comprised of at least two broad
"sub-duties": the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. In Arkansas, it
has long been held that a director has a duty to exercise reasonable
care in discharging his duties of managing, or overseeing the manage-
ment of, the corporation.10 A director also has a duty to act in good
faith for the benefit of the corporation, a duty which, in certain circum-
stances, includes the duty to place the corporation's interests above his
own selfish interests."
The 1987 Arkansas Business Corporation Act contains several pro-
visions relating to the fiduciary duties owned by directors. Section 4-27-
830 sets out the general standard applicable to directors and provides
that if that standard is met, the director is free from liability:
A. A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including
his duties as a member of a committee:
1. In good faith;
2. With the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would exercise under similar circumstances; and
3. In a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests
of the corporation.
D. A director is not liable for any action taken as a director, or
any failure to take any action, if he performed the duties of his office
in compliance with this section. 2
The primary thrust of this statute is the duty of care. Other provisions
of the Act govern conflict of interest transactions (a transaction with
the corporation in which a director has an interest),' 3 loans to direc-
tors,14 and liability for unlawful distributions.' 5 All of these provisions
are copied from the Revised Model Business Corporation Act version in
effect in 1986.16
10. E.g., Johnson v. Coleman, 179 Ark. 1087, 1094, 20 S.W.2d 186, 188 (1929); Sternberg
v. Blaine, 179 Ark. 448, 452, 17 S.W.2d 286, 288 (1929).
II. See generally Susan Webber [now United States District Judge Susan Webber
Wright], Arkansas Corporate Fiduciary Standards - Interested Directors' Contracts and the
Doctrine of Corporate Opportunity, 5 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 39 (1982).
12. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-830 (Michie 1991). See generally 2 MBCA ANN. § 8.30 (Of-
ficial Comment).
13. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-831 (Michie 1991).
14. Id. at § 4-27-832.
15. Id. at § 4-27-833.
16. The drafters of the RMBCA have since replaced the provisions on director conflict of
interest transactions and loans to directors in the RMBCA with a new subchapter F comprised of
new section numbers 8.60 through 8.63.
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What of a director who fails to comply with the statutory duty?
The 1987 Arkansas Act, like the Revised Model Business Corporation
Act, does not purport to codify the business judgment rule, which oper-
ates to protect directors against suits alleging breach of the duty of
care."7 In 1990, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the business
judgment rule is the law in Arkansas. 18 Quoting at length from a deci-
sion of the Ohio Supreme Court, the Arkansas Supreme Court said,
The business judgment rule is a principle of corporate governance that
has been a part of the common law for at least one hundred and fifty
years. It has traditionally operated as a shield to protect directors
from liability for their decisions. If the directors are entitled to the
protection of the rule, then the courts should not interfere with or
second-guess their decisions. If the directors are not entitled to the
protection of the rule, then the courts scrutinize the decision as to its
intrinsic fairness to the corporation and the corporation's minority
shareholders. The rule is a rebuttable presumption that directors are
better equipped than the courts to make business judgments and that
the directors acted without self-dealing or personal interest and exer-
cised reasonable diligence and acted with good faith. 19
The Arkansas court went on to elaborate:
Two elements must be satisfied in order for the rule to be invoked.
First, its protections can only be claimed by disinterested directors
whose conduct otherwise meets the tests of business judgment. Sec-
ond, to invoke the rule's protection, directors have a duty to inform
themselves of all material information reasonably available to them
prior to making a business decision. Having become so informed, they
must then act with requisite care in discharge of their duties.2
It is against this background of a statutorily articulated duty of
17. The Official Comment to RMBCA § 8.30 explains:
Even before statutory formulations of directors' duty of care, courts sometimes invoked
the business judgment rule in determining whether to impose liability in a particular
case. In doing so, courts have sometimes used language similar to the standards set
forth in section 8.30(a). The elements of the business judgment rule and the circum-
stances for its application are continuing to be developed by the courts. In view of that
continuing judicial development, section 8.30 does not try to codify the business judg-
ment rule or to delineate the differences, if any, between that rule and the standards of
director conduct set forth in this section. That is a task left to the courts and possibly to
later revisions of this Model Act.
2 MBCA ANN. § 8.30 (Official Comment).
18. Hall v. Staha, 303 Ark. 673, 678, 800 S.W.2d 396, 399 (1990).
19. Id. (quoting Gries Sports v. Cleveland Browns Football, 496 N.E.2d 959 (Ohio 1986)).
20. Id. (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984)).
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care, a duty of loyalty partly articulated by statute and largely deline-
ated by case law, and the business judgment rule that section 4-27-
202(B)(3) of the Arkansas Code Annotated must be analyzed. Section
4-27-202(B)(3) is a near-verbatim copy of title 8, section 102(b)(7) of
the Delaware Code Annotated.21 This statute authorizes a corporation
by optional charter provision to limit or eliminate the personal liability
of directors to shareholders for certain kinds of breaches of fiduciary
duty. This provision reads, in full:
§ 4-27-202. ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION.
B. The articles of incorporation may set forth:
3. A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a
director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages
for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provision
shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director:
(i) For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the
corporation or its stockholders;
(ii) For acts or omissions not in good faith or which in-
volve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law;
(iii) Under § 4-27-833 of this chapter [concerning direc-
tors' liability for unlawful distributions];
(iv) For any transaction from which the director derived
an improper personal benefit; or
(v) For any action, omission, transaction, or breach of a
director's duty creating any third-party liability to any person
or entity other than the corporation or stockholder.
No such provision shall eliminate or limit the liability of
a director for any act or omission occurring prior to the date
when such provision becomes effective. All references in this
subsection to a director shall also be deemed to refer to a
member of the governing body of a corporation which is not
authorized to issue capital stock."2
The effect of a charter provision adopted under the authority of this
statute" is to abridge, to some degree, a director's liability for failure
21. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991).
22. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-202 (Michie 1991).
23. Such a charter provision might simply track the statute, for example, "A director of the
corporation shall not be liable to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for
breach of fiduciary duty as a director except that this provision shall not eliminate or limit the
liability of a director for ...." Alternatively, a charter provision might be cast in general terms,
342 [Vol. 15:337
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to meet the standard of care prescribed in section 4-27-830.
Director-exculpation clauses have become common in the charters
of American corporations generally2' and are likely to become common
in the charters of Arkansas corporations. A director-exculpation clause,
however, provides only limited relief for directors beyond the protection
already afforded by the business judgment rule. The statute is drafted
in such a way that the scope of permitted exculpation is relatively nar-
row, confined to breaches of the duty of care untainted by self-dealing
or bad faith. In most cases, the effect of the clause will be simply to
relieve directors of liability for negligently failing to inform themselves
adequately before making decisions, and for abdication of the duty to
keep themselves informed about corporate affairs and to carry out their
duties of oversight.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF AN OPTIONAL
DIRECTOR-EXCULPATION CLAUSE
On its face, section 4-27-202(B)(3) appears to give corporations
the authority to exculpate directors from liability for many different
kinds of conduct. In fact, however, the permissible scope of exculpation
is relatively narrow.
Obviously, to the extent that federal law prohibits a corporation
from eliminating or limiting directors' liability, the federal law
preempts the state law permitting corporations to do so.2 5 Thus, a reg-
istered investment company cannot I include a director-exculpation
clause in its charter because of a prohibition in the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940.26 By contrast, while federal banking law does not
prohibit such clauses, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act preempts the effect o\f the clause to the extent that
the clause would otherwise absolve directors of liability to the financial
institution for gross negligence. In other words, despite the existence of
such a charter provision, if the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
for example, "To the fullest extent permitted by law, a director of the corporation shall not be
liable for breach of fiduciary duty." If the corporation wished merely to limit, and not to elimi-
nate, directors' liability, the charter provision might prescribe a dollar cap on liability. See gener-
ally Balotti & Gentile, supra note 4, at 19-22.
24. See Stroud v. Grace, No. CIV. A. 10719, 1990 WL 176803, at *8-9 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1,
1990, amended Dec. II, 1990) (stating that director-exculpation clauses "are now common in
corporate affairs"), aff'd in part. rev'd in part, 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992); Hanks, supra note 6, at
1211.
25. See generally, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(h) (1987); see Balotti & Gentile, supra note 4, at 13.
1993]
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has taken over a failed bank, it may sue a bank director for gross negli-
gence in managing the bank." And of course, the Arkansas legislature
is free to restrict the availability of exculpatory charter clauses in sub-
sequent legislation.2
Beyond the limits placed by federal (or possible future state) pre-
emption on the availability or effectiveness of director-exculpation
clauses, the scope of such clauses is limited by the very language of
section 4-27-202(B)(3). These limitations fall into two categories: con-
duct that is expected by virtue of the definition of what general type of
conduct may be the subject of exculpation ("definitional exceptions"),
and conduct that is expressly excepted from exculpation ("express ex-
ceptions"). These two categories will be discussed in turn.
A. Definitional Exceptions
The "definitional exceptions" to the scope of permitted exculpation
arise because the statute varies the common-law rule that directors are
liable to the corporation and its shareholders for breach of fiduciary
duty. It is elementary that a statute in derogation of the common law is
strictly construed.29 Thus, only the potential liabilities precisely defined
in the statute can be "taken out" of the common-law rule of liability."0
27. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (1989); FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1992). See
generally, e.g., Edward Brodsky, Bank Officials' Liability Under FIRREA, 206 N.Y.L.J., July 10,
1991, at 3.
28. E.g., IA NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23.16 (Sands
4th ed. 1985).
29. E.g., White v. State, 290 Ark. 130, 136, 717 S.W.2d 784, 787 (1986); Simmons First
Nat'l Bank v. Abbott, 288 Ark. 304, 305, 705 S.W.2d 3, 4 (1986); 3 NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTH-
ERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 61.01 (5th ed. 1992).
30. Section 4-27-202(B)(2)(iii) of the Arkansas Code Annotated, which permits the articles
of incorporation to set forth "provisions not inconsistent with law regarding: . . . Defining, limit-
ing, and regulating the powers of the corporation, its board of directors, and shareholders;" does
not affect this analysis. While a provision limiting or eliminating the right of shareholders or of
the corporation to sue directors might be viewed as a "definition" or "limitation" of the rights of
the corporation or its shareholders, such provisions are "inconsistent with" the common-law rule
that directors are subject to personal liability to the corporation and its shareholders for damages
caused by breach of fiduciary duty.
It is true that courts in some jurisdictions have upheld charter provisions that conflict with
common-law principles that would otherwise apply. E.g., Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93
A.2d 107 (Del. 1952) (charter provision permitting interested directors to be counted toward a
quorum not forbidden by Delaware law); Everett v. Phillips, 43 N.E.2d 18 (N.Y. 1942) (charter
clause authorizing directors to vote on matters in which they have dual interests relevant to level
of scrutiny given transaction attacked on ground of directors' conflicting interests). But the princi-
ple that directors are subject to personal liability for breach of fiduciary duty is so fundamental to
corporate law, it seems highly unlikely that a court would give effect to a director-exculpation
[Vol. 15:337
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1. The Statute Applies Only To Breach of Fiduciary Duty by a
Director.
Only directors acting as directors can be absolved of liability for
breach of fiduciary duty. Other corporate actors, officers and control-
ling shareholders, also owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and its
shareholders.3 1 Unlike some other states' statutes,32 the Arkansas stat-
ute does not permit shareholders to absolve non-directors of personal
liability for breach of fiduciary duty. Thus, directors who are also cor-
porate officers or controlling shareholders cannot be absolved of liabil-
ity for breaches of the fiduciary duty that, in their other roles, they owe
the corporation and its shareholders.
33
2. The Statute Applies Only To Suits For Monetary Damages.
The statute does not authorize charter provisions protecting direc-
tors against requests for relief other than monetary damages. Suits for
an injunction, for an accounting, for an order removing a director from
office, or for other kinds of equitable relief 4 are outside the scope of
the statutorily permitted exculpation clause. 5 Similarly, a suit by a
shareholder or the corporation against a director seeking restitutionary
relief in the form of money damages should not be affected by.the stat-
clause that purported to broaden the scope of exculpation beyond the statutory limits. See Hanks
& Scriggins, supra note I, at 246.
31. Regarding the fiduciary duties owed by corporate officers, ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-842
prescribes a standard of conduct for corporate officers "with discretionary authority" virtually
identical to that prescribed for corporate directors in ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-830. In a case
decided before the enactment of the 1987 Act, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that a person
who is both a director and an officer in a company has an even greater fiduciary duty. Raines v.
Toney, 228 Ark. 1170, 1178-79, 313 S.W.2d 802, 808 (1958). For a recent analysis of the nature
of the fiduciary duties of corporate officers, see A. Gilchrist Sparks, Ill & Lawrence A.
Hamermesh, Common Law Duties of Non-Director Corporate Officers, 48 Bus. LAW. 215 (1992).
The Arkansas courts have apparently not addressed in any published decision the question of
fiduciary duties owed by controlling stockholders. For a general discussion of the topic, see, e.g.,
12B WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§§ 5810, 5811 (Cynthia Van Swearingen, ed., 1984 & Supp. 1991).
32. E.g., LA. Bus. CORP. LAW § 12:24(C)(4) (Supp. 1991); MD. GEN. CORP. LAW §§ 2-
104(b)(8), 2-405.2 (Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.037(l) (1987).
33. Balotti & Gentile, supra note 4, at i2; Veasey et al., supra note I, at 403. Cf. I MBCA
ANN. § 2.02 (Official Comment) (analogous RMBCA provision does not apply to actions taken by
a director in some other capacity, such as officer, employee, or controlling shareholder).
34. See generally, e.g., Howard W. Brill, Equity and the Restitutionary Remedies: Con-
structive Trust, Equitable Lien. and Subrogation, 1992 ARK. L. NOTES I.
35. E.g., Gelb, supra note 4, at 32; Veasey et al., supra note I, at 403.
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ute.36 A suit "for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty"
seeks to compensate the plaintiff for the harm the defendant has caused
him, without regard to whether the defendant reaped a personal benefit
from his injurious conduct."' By contrast, a suit for restitutionary relief
seeks to recover benefits the director acquired wrongfully. "[T]he un-
derlying principle is that one person should not unjustly enrich himself
at the expense of another." 3 Even if the corporation was not harmed
by the breach of fiduciary duty, the corporation (directly or through a
shareholders' derivative action) should be permitted to recover any
gains the wrongdoer secured by the breach.39 In sum, a suit for restitu-
tionary relief is an alternative to a suit for "monetary damages," and
an action to recover gains that a director secured through breach of
fiduciary duty should not be barred by a director-exculpation clause. 0
3. The Statute Applies Only To Suits For Breach of Fiduciary
Duty.
The statute permits exculpation only for a director's breach of fi-
duciary duty. It does not apply to suits brought by the corporation or
the shareholders which arise under other state or federal laws.41 For
example, a director who fails to prove the "due diligence" defense is
personally liable for misstatements in a registration statement filed
under the Securities Act of 1933; the liability runs to persons who pur-
36. See Dale A. Oesterle, The Effect of Statutes Limiting Directors' Due Care Liability on
Hostile Takeover Defenses, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 33 n.9 (1989).
37. "Compensatory damages are awarded for the purpose of making the injured party
whole, as nearly as possible." Dunaway v. Troutt, 232 Ark. 615, 626, 339 S.W.2d 613, 620
(1960).
38. Dews v. Halliburton Indus., Inc., 288 Ark. 532, 536, 708 S.W.2d 67, 69 (1986). As
Professor Brill points out, "Regardless of whether monetary restitution or equitable restitution is
sought, the elements of the underlying cause of action are the same." Brill, supra note 34, at 2.
39. See, e.g., Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1969) (officers and directors
can be compelled to account to corporation for profits derived through insider trading, even
though corporation may not have been harmed by the breach of fiduciary duty).
40. See, e.g., HOWARD W. BRILL, ARKANSAS LAW OF DAMAGES § 33-2, at 450 (2d ed.
1990) (recovery under a contract implied in law "is not based upon damages, but is restitutionary
in nature"). The Restatement of Restitution supports this view of damages and restitution as
alternative remedies. "A fiduciary who commits a breach of his duty as fiduciary is guilty of
tortious conduct and the beneficiary can obtain redress either at law or in equity for the harm
done. As an alternative, the beneficiary is entitled to obtain the benefits derived by the fiduciary
through the breach of duty." RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 138 cmt. a (1937).
41. E.g., Osterle, supra note 36, at 32-33; see Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 979
F.2d 332, 342 n.8 (1992) (holding Virginia's statutory director-liability cap did not limit plaintiff
shareholders' recovery on their federal securities law claim).
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chased shares registered under that registration statement.' The Ar-
kansas Securities Act contains a somewhat analogous provision. Under
the Arkansas Securities Act, a director of a corporation that offers or
sells a security in violation of the registration provisions of the Act or
by means of a materially misleading misstatement or omission is liable
to one who purchases stock unless the director can prove "that he did
not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known,
of the existence of facts" on which the violation is predicated. "3 In both
of these instances, the director is not liable because he breached a fidu-
ciary duty; he is liable because he failed to meet the standard of con-
duct prescribed by the securities laws, and a director-exculpation clause
will not protect him.
Similarly, a director-exculpation clause should not protect a direc-
tor from liability for breach of a nonfiduciary or quasi-contractual
duty." In other words, a director who engages in conduct that would
be actionable even if committed by a non-director should not be per-
mitted to escape liability simply because the wrongful conduct also
amounted to a breach of his fiduciary duty as a director. For example,
if a director tortiously interferes with a contract between the corpora-
tion and a third party, in circumstances under which even a stranger to
the corporation would be liable in tort to the corporation, the director
should not be permitted to rely on a director-exculpation clause to es-
cape liability.' 5 Similarly, if a director negligently misrepresents mate-
rial facts about the corporation directly to a shareholder, and the direc-
tor should have known that the shareholder would likely rely on those
statements, a director-exculpation clause should not protect the director
42. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1934); e.g., Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967); Abbey v.
Computer Memories, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 870 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
43. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-42-106(c) (Michie 1987).
44. See Hanks, supra note 6, at 1210 n.17 (several states enacting charter option statutes
omitted the word "fiduciary" from their statutes, perhaps "to permit corporations to limit or elim-
inate the personal liability of directors for breach of nonfiduciary or quasi-contractual duties as
.well"). Of course, to the extent that a claim is brought on the theory of quasi-contract and seeks
restitutional relief, the suit should not be characterized as one "for money damages." See discus-
sion at part I.A.2, supra.
45. While tortious interference with contractual relations is an intentional tort, e.g., Mid-
South Beverages, Inc. v. Forrest City Grocery Co., 300 Ark. 204, 778 S.W.2d 218 (1989), and
might be outside the scope of an exculpation clause because it is an act or omission "not in good
faith or which involve[s] intentional misconduct," ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-202(B)(3)(ii), that
issue need not be addressed, because the director's liability is not liability for breach of fiduciary




4. The Statute Applies Only To Suits Asserting Liability to the
Corporation or To Stockholders.
The statute does not permit any restriction of a director's liability
to persons other than the corporation or its shareholders. This is both a
definitional exception and an express exception. The Arkansas legisla-
ture underscored this limitation by adding a sentence to the statute
that does not appear in the Delaware statute which served as a model.
This sentence states that a corporation cannot limit or eliminate a di-
rector's liability "[flor any action, omission, transaction, or breach of a
director's duty creating any third-party liability to any person or entity
other than the corporation or stockholder."4 The legislature's desire to
emphasize this point is a bit curious, because most cases involving a
third party's claim against a director will not be founded on a breach of
fiduciary duty theory. Ordinarily, directors do not owe fiduciary duties
to outsiders, but only to the corporation and its shareholders.
a. Directors' Liability to Third Parties-Non-Fiduciary Ba-
ses of Liability
Directors' liability to third parties is usually founded on non-cor-
porate law principles, including the laws of contract and of agency.48
For example, a director who guarantees a corporate debt is liable to the
creditor upon the contract of guaranty. And under general agency law
principles, a director who makes a contract for and in the name of the
corporation, but who lacked actual or apparent authority to do so, is
personally liable on the contract absent ratification by the corporation
or knowledge by the other party of the director's lack of authority.49
Moreover, while a director is ordinarily not responsible for the
46. This discussion assumes that negligent misrepresentations made in circumstances such
as this are actionable in Arkansas. To date, the Arkansas Supreme Court has not recognized the
tort of negligent misrepresentation. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
47. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-202(B)(3)(v) (Michie 1991).
48. E.g., Schlater v. Haynie, 833 S.W.2d 919, 924 (Tenn. App. 1992) ("Ordinarily, a direc-
tor of a corporation is an agent of the corporation and is liable only to the corporation. To become
directly liable to a [corporate] creditor, there must be some violation of statutory duty or other
conduct which establishes a privity of contract with or tortious injury to the creditor for which an
action ex delicto will lie.").
49. E.g., 3A WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER'S CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 1123 (Stephen M. Flanagan & Charles R. P. Keating, eds., perm. ed. rev. vol.
1986 & Supp. 1992); see also Dale v. Donaldson Lumber Co., 48 Ark. 188, 2 S.W. 703 (1887).
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torts or other wrongs of the corporation,"0 the director is liable for
wrongs that he personally commits against third parties, even though
the director is acting on behalf of the corporation. 1 In addition, a di-
rector is personally liable for wrongful action in which he participates,
either directly or by authorizing or instructing others to commit, or in
which he knowingly acquiesces.52 The factual scenarios are, of course,
infinitely variable, and it is far from clear how close the connection
must be, in order for personal liability to attach, between the director's
action or inaction and the actual commission of the wrongful act. The
battleground today lies primarily in the realm of federal regulation, as
plaintiffs (including the government) seek deep pockets to pay for envi-
ronmental cleanup costs,53 underfunded pension plans,54 patent, trade-
50. E.g., L.B. Indus., Inc. v. Smith, 817 F.2d 69, 71 (9th Cir. 1987); 3A FLETCHER, supra
note 49, § 1137.
51. E.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726, 744
(8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); Vaske v. DuCharme, McMillen & Assoc.,
Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1158, 1166 (D. Colo. 1990); In re Mills, Ill B.R. 186, 195 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.
1988); 3A FLETCHER, supra note 49, § 1135; HENRY W. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPO-
RATIONS § 112 (rev. ed 1946); WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPO-
RATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 2.11 (4th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1991). See also, e.g., Myers v.
Martin, 168 Ark. 1028, 272 S.W. 856 (1925) (bank president held liable for fraudulent mis-
presentations made to purchaser of bank stock about financial condition of bank). Cf. Godwin v.
Churchman, 305 Ark. 520, 529-30, 810 S.W.2d 34, 38-39 (1991) (shareholder-officers of corpora-
tion were subject to personal liability for conversion where they misappropriated corporate
property).
52. E.g., 3A FLETCHER, supra note 49, § 1137; L.B. Indus., Inc., 817 F.2d at 71; Transgo,
Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1021 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1059 (1986); Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1985).
53. E.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, § 107(a). 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,
§ 7003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a). See generally, e.g., Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons
Co., 966 F.2d 837, 844 (4th Cir. 1992) (individual defendants who were directors, officers, and
shareholders of corporation liable under CERCLA were not personally liable under CERCLA
because their father, president and majority shareholder, exercised ultimate authority over plant);
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726, 742-46 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987) (two individuals who were shareholders and, respec-
tively, president and vice-president of corporation held personally liable; president, who was major
shareholder, was liable even though he was not personally involved in decision to transport and
dispose of hazardous substances, because as the individual in charge of and directly responsible for
all corporate activities, he had the ultimate authority to control the disposal of the corporation's
hazardous substances); Kelley ex rel. Michigan Natural Resources Comm'n v. ARCO Indus.
Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1214, 1220 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (test for imposing personal liability under
CERCLA on actor in close corporation is "whether the individual . . . could have prevented or
significantly abated the release of hazardous substances").
Amidst the torrent of recent law review commentary on environmental law liabilities are
several recent articles discussing the personal liability of corporate directors and other actors. E.g.,
Michael P. Healy, Direct Liability for Hazardous Substance Cleanups Under CERCLA: A Corn-
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mark, and copyright infringements,6" and a host of other public and
private wrongs."" Again, these asserted liabilities are founded not on a
prehensive Approach, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 65, 104-09 (1992); Gregory P. O'Hara, Minimiz-
ing Exposure to Environmental Liabilities for Corporate Officers. Directors, Shareholders and
Successors, 6 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (1990); William S. Biel, Comment,
Whistling Past the Waste Site: Directors' and Officers' Personal Liability for Environmental De-
cisions and the Role of Liability Insurance Coverage, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 241 (1991); S.D. Mor-
gan, Recent Developments, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1554 (1992). See also Jose R. Allen & Robert P.
Doty, Toxic Shock: Personal Liability of Corporate Officers Under CERCLA, in Hazardous
Wastes, Superfund, and Toxic Substances 31 (ALI-ABA Study Materials, Oct. 31-Nov. 1, 1991).
54. For a discussion of the various approaches courts have taken to the question of officer
and director liability under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1990), see Rockney v. Blohorn, 877
F.2d 637, 639-43 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that corporate officers are not personally liable for
unpaid plan contributions unless there is a basis for piercing the corporate veil); accord, Pipe
Fitters Health & Welfare Trust v. Waldo, R., Inc., 969 F.2d 718, 721 (8th Cir. 1992) (refusing to
hold individual who owned all the stock of two corporations liable for corporations' failure to make
ERISA contributions, because individual had shown proper respect for corporate formalities and
there was no basis for piercing the corporate veil). See generally EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRI-
CIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS §§ 18:10 -:11 (1984); KNEPPER &
BAILEY, supra note 51, ch. 9.
55. See generally, e.g., Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565,
1579 (Fed Cir. 1986) (upholding verdicts of personal liability against individuals who were sole
officers, directors, and shareholders of corporation which infringed plaintiff's patent; individuals
"were directly responsible for the design and production of the infringing chairs and ... were the
only ones who stood to benefit from sales of those chairs."); Rilting Music, Inc. v. Speakeasy
Enterprises, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (president of corporation which owned
nightclub was jointly and severally liable with corporation for infringement of copyrights on music
publicly performed at club, where president was dominant influence on nightclub's operation,
knew of ongoing infringement, and benefitted financially from the infringing activity); United
States Surgical Corp. v. Hospital Products Int'l Pty. Ltd., 701 F. Supp. 314, 352 (D. Conn. 1988)
(personal liability imposed on individual who was moving force behind infringement by virtue of
his activities as officer, director, and controlling shareholder of the infringing corporations); Polo
Fashions, Inc. v. Branded Apparel Merchandising, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 648, 652-53 (D. Mass.
1984) (if corporate officer is a moving, active force behind corporation's infringement of trade-
mark, officer will be held personally liable even if officer did not know his acts would result in
infringement); Ned L. Conley & Eric P. Mirabel, The Expanding Personal Liability of Corpo-
rate Officers and Directors for Patent Infringement, 28 IDEA J.L. & TECH. 225 (1988); Joshua L.
Cohen, Note, Corporate Officers and Directors: Likely Targets in Patent Infringement Actions,
16 DEL J. CORP. L. 1327, 1356-57 (1991); Gary M. Ropski, Enforcement Defense, in Securing
and Enforcing Patent Rights 441, 466 (ALI-ABA Study Materials, Nov. 15-16, 1990).
56. See generally, e.g., Cintronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Herrington, 826 F.2d 16, 23-
28 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987) (individual who was presi-
dent, director, and major stockholder of corporations involved in crude oil transfers held person-
ally liable for violation of domestic crude oil pricing laws); L.C.L. Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia
Pictures Indus., Inc. 619 F.2d 455, 457 (5th Cir. 1980) (individual who was corporation's presi-
dent and principal shareholder held personally liable for corporation's breach of contract by fraud-
ulently underreporting movie box office receipts, because act was done with his authorization,
participation, and approval); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 517 F.2d 1141,
1142-46 (4th Cir. 1975) (directors of nonprofit corporation which operated a swimming pool held
personally liable for violation of civil rights laws for adopting a whites-only policy); KNEPPER &
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theory of breach of fiduciary duty, but rather upon asserted violations
of specific substantive laws.
b. Directors' Liability to Third Parties-Fiduciary Bases of
Liability
The question of whether and when directors owe fiduciary duties
to persons other than the corporation and its shareholders is a particu-
larly murky one. Corporate creditors may claim that directors owe a
fiduciary duty to them under certain circumstances. The generally ac-
cepted rule is that the rights of corporate creditors are purely contrac-
tual, and directors owe no fiduciary duty to creditors and need not con-
sider the interests of creditors in making corporate decisions.57
However, some states, including Delaware, have recognized an excep-
tion to the general rule: when a corporation becomes insolvent, the di-
rectors have a fiduciary duty to the creditors to conserve the assets of
the corporation so that the assets are available to pay the creditors'
claims. 8 In these states, a director who breaches this fiduciary duty is
personally liable to the creditors for damages caused by the breach. 9
Arkansas law on this point is quite confusing, and arguably sup-
ports the proposition that corporate directors owe a fiduciary duty to
BAILEY, supra note 51, §§ 10.09-.12 (employment-related liability), ch. 12 (financial institutions
and their management); Wilson McLeod, Shareholders' Liability and Workers' Rights: Piercing
the Corporate Veil Under Federal Labor Law, 9 HOFSTRA LABOR L.J. 115 (1991); David W.
Evans & Paul S. Cohen, Professional Liability Targets in Cases of Insolvency: Directors and
Officers, and Accountants, in Insurance Company Solvency-Capital Adequacy, Regulatory De-
velopments, and Liability Issues 157 (PLI 1991); Vincent J. Vitkowski & James H. Irish, Liabil-
ity of Directors and Officers and Accountants of Insolvent Insurance Companies, in Insurance
Company Solvency-Capital Adequacy, Regulatory Developments, and Liability Issues 101 (PLI
1991).
57. E.g., Lewis U. Davis, Jr. et al., Corporate Reorganization in the 1990s: Guiding Direc-
tors of Troubled Corporations Through Uncertain Territory, 47 Bus. LAW. I, 2 (1991).
58. A recent Delaware Chancery Court decision, Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., re-
viewed Delaware law concerning a director's fiduciary obligations to corporate creditors and con-
cluded that, in Delaware, "the general rule is that directors do not owe creditors duties beyond
relevant contractual terms absent 'special circumstances' ..., e.g., fraud, insolvency, or a viola-
tion of a statute .... " No. CIV. A. 12406, 1992 WL 13647, at *3 (Del. Ch. June 18, 1992)
(quoting Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 222 (Del. Ch. 1974), rev'd in part on other grounds,
347 A.2d 133 (Del. 1975)). The Geyer court noted that Delaware courts had recently defined a
fourth category of "special circumstances": the institution of dissolution proceedings. Id. In Geyer,
the chancery court interpreted the special circumstance of "insolvency" to mean insolvency in fact
and not to require a showing that statutory proceedings such as bankruptcy proceedings had been
instituted. Id. at *3-4.
59. See, e.g., Gregory V. Varallo & Jesse A. Finkelstein, Fiduciary Obligations of Directors
of the Financially Troubled Company, 48 Bus. LAw. 239 (1992); Davis, Jr., et al., supra note 57.
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corporate creditors not merely to conserve assets when the corporation
becomes insolvent, but also a duty to manage the corporation with due
care so that it does not become insolvent. Creditors can sue to impose
personal liability on directors who breach this duty.60 The leading Ar-
kansas case is Sternberg v. Blaine,6" decided in 1929, in which the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court announced:
It may therefore be stated as the settled rule in this State that any
failure of a director to exercise diligence or good faith which results in
loss to a stockholder or creditor, entitles such stockholder or creditor
to require the directors whose negligence has caused the loss to pay.
In other words, the director whose negligence causes loss is liable for
such loss to stockholders and creditors.
62
Stenberg was followed in two later decisions handed down in 192963
and in 1934.64
There were no other reported decisions on the question until 1963,
when Judge Gordon E. Young of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Arkansas rendered a decision in Hi-Pro Fish
Products, Inc. v. McClure.15 In an extensively researched and reasoned
opinion, Judge Young concluded that "such a cause of action in favor
of the individual creditor no longer exists in Arkansas." 6 However, in
1979, in Smith v. Citation Manufacturing Co.,6" the Arkansas Su-
preme Court quoted with approval the "settled rule" enunciated in
Sternberg.6" The court did not refer to Judge Young's opinion in Hi-
Pro, and given the fact that Smith involved a claim that a director had
breached his fiduciary duty to the corporation (and not a claim that the
director owed or had breached any fiduciary duty to a corporate credi-
tor), the issue remains open.6 9
60. See Harry Meek, Changes Needed in the Present Arkansas Corporation Act, 10 ARK.
L. REV. I, 2 (1955) (acknowledging possibility that a corporate creditor can sue directors for
general mismanagement through a creditor's bill if the corporation becomes insolvent).
61. 179 Ark. 448, 17 S.W.2d 286 (1929).
62. Id. at 453, 17 S.W.2d at 288.
63. Johnson v. Coleman, 179 Ark. 1087, 1094, 20 S.W.2d 186, 188 (1929).
64. Milburn v. Martin, 190 Ark. 16, 23, 76 S.W.2d 952, 955 (1934).
65. 224 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Ark. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 346 F.2d 497 (8th Cir.
1965).
66. 224 F. Supp. at 491.
67. Smith v. Citation Mfg. Co., 266 Ark. 591, 587 S.W.2d 39 (1979).
68. Id. at 597, 587 S.W.2d at 41.
69. The extent of the current uncertainty on this issue is underscored by a 1984 opinion of
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Arkansas in which the court
reiterated the Sternberg rule as having "long been the law in Arkansas." In re Ozark Restaurant
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The issue is an important one, because a director-exculpation
clause may prevent a trustee in bankruptcy from suing corporate direc-
tors for mismanagement. The trustee succeeds to all the rights of the
corporation to sue directors for mismanagement. 0 If the corporation's
charter contains a director-exculpation clause, then the corporation has
no right to impose personal liability upon its directors for simple negli-
gence. If, however, the directors owe a duty to corporate creditors to
exercise due care in the management of the corporation, a director-
exculpation clause does not affect directors' liability for breach of that
duty, 7 1 and creditors should be able to assert the claim -in their own
right.72
B. Express Exceptions
The most striking feature of section 4-27-202(B)(3) is its list of
exceptions. To recap, the corporation is not permitted to limit or elimi-
nate a director's liability to the shareholders or the corporation:
- For "any breach of the . . . duty of loyalty";
- For "acts or omissions not in good faith";
- For acts or omissions "which involve intentional misconduct";
- For acts or omissions which involve "a knowing violation of
law";
Equip. Co., 41 B.R. 476, 480 (W.D. Ark. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 61 B.R. 750 (W.D. Ark.
1986), affid, 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
70. E.g., In re Ozark Restaurant Equip. Co., 816 F.2d 1222, 1225 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 848 (1987).
71. See Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., No. CIV. A. 12406, 1992 WL 136473, at *3
(Del. Ch. June 18, 1992) (recognizing that if a corporation's charter contained a director-exculpa-
tion clause, it is possible that a director may be held liable to a creditor for breach of fiduciary
duty even though the director could not be held liable to a shareholder).
72. In In re Ozark Restaurant Equip. Co., 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
848 (1987), the eighth circuit held that a trustee in bankruptcy has no standing to assert a claim
based on obligations or liabilities that, under state law, run to corporate creditors personally rather
than to the corporation. Id. at 1225. The court held further that a trustee in bankruptcy cannot
bring an alter ego action against corporate principals, because "the obligations and liabilities of an
action to pierce the corporate veil in Arkansas do not run to the corporation, but to third parties,
e.g., creditors of the corporation." Id.
Of course, an alter ego action differs from a suit for damages based on breach of fiduciary
duty, and Ozark should not be read to mean that Arkansas corporations and their shareholders
have no right to sue their directors for breach of fiduciary duty. (For an explanation of the differ-
ence, see District Judge Waters' thoughtful opinion in the Ozark case, In re Ozark Restaurant
Equip. Co., Inc., 61 B.R. 750, 755 (W.D. Ark. 1986)). The point is that while a director-exculpa-
tion clause may bar such a suit by shareholders in a derivative suit or by a trustee or receiver
acting on behalf of the corporation, the same clause should not bar an action brought by creditors
even if it is based on the same type of director misfeasance or nonfeasance.
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- For liability arising from making distributions in violation of
section 4-27-833;
- For "any transaction from which the director derived an im-
proper personal benefit";
- For acts or omissions "creating any third-party liability"; and
- For "any act or omission occuring prior to the date when" the
director-exculpation clause became effective
a.7
The biggest problem with the express exceptions are their vague-
ness. 4 What is a "breach of the director's duty of loyalty"? 75 The 1987
Act does not define the "duty of loyalty." Presumably, it extends be-
yond the "conflict of interest transaction" regulated by another section
of the act 76 to reach also usurpation of corporate opportunity, wrongful
competition with the corporation, unfair treatment by majority share-
holders of a minority shareholder in corporate acquisition and reorgani-
zation transactions, use of corporate funds to perpetuate control, and
insider trading.7 7 Moreover, the duty of loyalty tends to blur into the
duty of care, especially when it is alleged that directors took arguably
imprudent action motivated in part by a desire to keep their positions
or protect themselves from potential liability. 8
What are "acts or omissions not in good faith"? "Good faith" is
not defined in the act. What is "intentional misconduct"? Is it different
from lack of "good faith"? Would "recklessness" satisfy one or both of
73. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-202(B)(3) (Michie 1991).
74. See generally Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Revised Model Business
Corporation Act-Amendment Pertaining to the Liability of Directors, 45 Bus. LAW. 695, 697-98
(1990); Gelb, supra note 4, at 38 ("Indeed, because of situations where it will be necessary to
litigate questions of law and fact regarding the application of the various exceptions in the anti-
liability statutes, an anti-liability charter provision will not always lead to the quick and easy
elimination of breach of duty suits. The need for such litigation and its costs and uncertainties
make it clear that such provisions offer no panacea for directors.").
75. "The duty of loyalty exception is a particularly likely subject for litigation since the line
between the duty of care and duty of loyalty is not always completely clear." Stephen A. Radin,
The Director's Duty of Care Three Years After Smith v. Van Gorkom, 39 HASTINGS L.3. 707, 746
n.279 (1988).
76. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-831 (Michie 1991).
.77. 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.9, at 204-05 (2d ed. 1990).
78. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986). In an attempt to fend off hostile takeover, the directors entered into a "lock-up" agreement
with a competing bidder that was designed, in part, to shore up the market value of notes the
corporation had previously issued in order to protect directors from suit by irate noteholders. The
court first characterizes this a breach of the duty of loyalty owed by the directors to the stockhold-
ers, id. at 182, but later characterizes it as a breach of the duty of care, id. at 185. See generally
Hanks, supra note 6, at 1212; Oesterle, supra note 36, at 43-47.
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these tests? 9 Would "gross negligence"? 8" Does a series of negligent
acts extending over a considerable period of time amount to "inten-
tional misconduct"?
8'
What is a "knowing violation of law"? Must the director know
that his conduct is unlawful, or must he simply know that he is engag-
ing in the conduct?8 2 Is the "law" restricted to criminal law? Does it
include violations of federal antitrust, securities, 83 fair election,8
4 occu-
pational safety,85 and other federal laws regulating commercial con-
duct? Might breaches of contract and common-law torts constitute "vi-
olations of law"? 8 6
What is an "improper personal benefit"? Under what circum-
stances would a benefit be "improper" if it did not involve a breach of
the duty of loyalty or "bad faith"? The statute does not say that the
benefit must be a pecuniary one. Might the "improper personal bene-
fit" include business goodwill, personal friendship, social reputation, or
continued tenure on the board?8" It is worth noting that in the federal
insider trading context, in which a tipper's personal benefit determines
79. See Balotti & Gentile, supra note 4, at 16; Gelb, supra note 4, at 34-35; Veasey et al.,
supra note 1, at 403.
80. The Delaware statute on which the Arkansas statute is modelled permits exculpation of
directors for gross negligence. Veasey et al., supra note 1, at 402. Gross negligence is the standard
of liability for directors in Delaware. Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes to the Revised
Model Business Corporation Act-Amendment Pertaining to the Liability of Directors, 45 Bus.
LAW. 695, 695 (1990). In Arkansas, by contrast, the standard is simple negligence. See, e.g., Hi-
Pro Fish Products, Inc. v. McClure, 224 F. Supp. 485, 489-91 (E.D. Ark. 1963) (in Arkansas,
corporate director is required to use ordinary care in the management of corporate affairs), revd
on other grounds, 346 F.2d 497 (8th Cir. 1965); Johnson v. Coleman, 179 Ark. 1087, 1094, 20
S.W.2d 186, 188 (1929); Sternberg v. Blaine, 179 Ark. 448 453-54, 17 S.W.2d 286, 288-89
(1929). Will the statute be construed so as to permit exculpation only for conduct meeting the
minimum culpability test for liability under Arkansas law?
81. See Bailey v. O'Neal, 92 Ark. 327, 333-34, 122 S.W. 503, 505 (1909); Franklin D.
Arey IlI, Bank Directors' Duties Under the Common Law of Arkansas, II U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
L.J. 629, 644-46 (1988-89).
82. Under the Arkansas Criminal Code, a person commits a crime "knowingly" as long as
he has knowledge with respect to his conduct; knowledge or ignorance of the law is generally
immaterial. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-2-202(2), -203(d), -206(b), (c) (Michie 1987).
83. The fourth circuit recently held that where directors had approved a proxy statement
without actual knowledge as to whether the statements made therein were true or false, thereby
committing fraud in violation of the Securities Exchange Act, they had knowingly violated the law
and therefore were not protected by Virginia's director-protection statute. Sandberg v. Virginia
Bankshares, Inc., 979 F.2d 332, 344-46 (4th Cir. 1992).
84. See Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Cusack, 806 F. Supp. 47 (D.N.J. 1992).
86. Gelb, supra note 4, at 36.
87. Hanks, supra note 6, at 1213.
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whether or not he breached his fiduciary duty so as to become liable for
a violation of the insider trading laws, the benefit may consist of simply
an enhanced reputation or the satisfaction of having made a gift to a
relative or friend.
88
What is an act or omission "occuring prior to the date when" the
director-exculpation clause becomes effective? 89 What of a continuing
course of simply negligent conduct by a director, with some acts or
omissions occuring before the clause's effective date, and some occur-
ring after? Is the injured corporation or shareholder permitted to re-
cover all of its damages, or merely damages directly attributable to the
negligence that occurred before the effective date?
III. CONCLUSION
The substantive effect of a director-exculpation clause adopted
under the authority of section 4-27-202(B)(3), given the exceptions dis-
cussed above, is rather limited. It is impossible to predict how many
claims brought against directors will fall squarely within the scope of
the exculpation clause. As discussed above, it appears that only claims
alleging negligence-simple negligence, and perhaps "aggravated negli-
gence"-and unalloyed by any hint of self-dealing or bad faith are cov-
ered by the exculpation clause.
Until the 1980s, it was difficult to find a reported decision in which
a director was held liable for a "pure" breach of the duty of care.90
With increasing takeover activity in the 1980s, however, courts began
to characterize directors' quick-response defensive actions as breaches
of the duty of care. Smith v. Van Gorkom9t was such a case. However,
in most "director negligence" cases a skillful pleader should be able to
characterize the directors' actions as colorable "bad faith" or a breach
of the duty of loyalty.92 The question is whether the courts will play
88. See e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662-64 (1983). The Securities and Exchange
Commission has been quite aggressive in arguing for an expansive definition of "personal benefit."
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Disclosures to Analysts Are Risky, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 1, 1993, at 20, 22.
89. The clause becomes effective when articles of incorporation, or an amendment to the
articles of incorporation, are filed with the Secretary of State, or at a later date if the document so
specifies. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-123 (Michie 1991).
90. See e.g., John W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the
Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers. 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1095 (1968); Mark A.
Sargent, Two Cheers for the Maryland Director and Officer Liability Statute, 18 U. BALT. L.
REV. 278, 284 (1989).
91. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).




Those cases that do involve "pure negligence" almost certainly in-
volve, at bottom, a claim that the directors used poor judgment. Of
course, the business judgment rule is supposed to protect directors
against liability for simple mistakes of judgment in making business
decisions. But there is a condition that even disinterested directors must
satisfy before they can claim the protection of the business judgment
rule: they must "inform themselves of all material information reasona-
bly available to them prior to making a business decision."9 ' The sub-
stantive effect of an exculpatory provision in the charter of an Arkansas
corporation will probably operate most often to protect directors who
"flunk" this procedural prong of the business judgment rule test. It will
also, of course, protect directors who negligently fail to make a busi-
ness judgment-conduct not protected by the business judgment rule at
all.9"
Where a complaint by a shareholder or the corporation states a
claim that falls squarely within the exculpatory zone, the defendants
should be able to obtain a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Arkan-
sas or Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. An early dismissal, of course,
results in considerable savings of litigation costs and reduces the pres-
sure to settle. These savings may well inure to the corporation itself, if
the corporation would otherwise elect to indemnify the defendant direc-
tors against litigation costs and the amount of any settlement. 96
93. See Oesterle, supra note 36, at 40-50.
94. Hall v. Staha, 303 Ark. 673, 678, 800 S.W.2d 396, 399 (1990). This "procedural" facet
of the duty of care has become the predominant theme in Delaware decisions addressing claimed
breaches of the duty of care. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Intracorporate Process and the
Avoidance of Director Liability, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97 (1989). It was to protect directors
who "flunk" this test that the Delaware legislature enacted the statute that served as the model
for section 4-27-202(B)(3).
95. See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 6, at 924 (discussing Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432
A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981)).
96. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-850 (Michie 1991).
The dismissal benefit is illustrated by a recent Delaware case, In re Dataproducts Sharehold-
ers Litigation, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,227 (Del. Ch. Aug, 22,
1991). In Dataproducts, the board of directors of Dataproducts approved a tender offer by and
second stage merger with Hitachi at a price of $10 per share. Hitachi promptly announced the
tender offer at that price. Four days later, Hitachi's offer and Dataproducts' Schedule 14D-9
recommending the transaction were sent to Dataproducts' shareholders. These documents dis-
closed that Dataproducts had higher earnings in the third quarter than had been projected, and
predicted that fourth quarter earnings would exceed prior projections as well. Some two and one-
half weeks later, Dataproducts announced its fourth quarter earnings, confirming its earlier, opti-
mistic prediction and disclosing that the net loss for the entire year was significantly lower than
had been expected by either the company or analysts. The takeover was consummated twelve days
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While the director-exculpation mechanism provided by section 4-
27-202(B)(3) enables Arkansas corporations to protect their directors
and their corporations against the necessity of expending corporate or
personal resources to litigate claims alleging corporate mismanage-
ment, we may question whether the benefits outweigh the costs. There
is little indication in the reported cases that Arkansas corporations are
plagued by suits of this nature. This may be because honest directors of
Arkansas corporations take their duties seriously, or it may be because
the difficulties of proof-especially proof of causation97-are so great.
But to the extent that a director negligently fails to inform himself to a
reasonable degree before making a business decision, or wholly abdi-
cates his duty to oversee the management of the corporation, and his
negligence is proved to be the proximate cause of the corporation's or
the shareholders' loss, it is hard to see any justification for absolving
the director of liability for the consequences of his dereliction of duty.
As between a negligent director and the shareholders who trusted him
to look after their investment in a prudent manner, it hardly seems fair
that the shareholders should suffer the consequences.
It might be argued that a person need not invest in a corporation
with a director-exculpation clause in its charter. This argument over'-
looks the fact that a director-exculpation clause can be added to the
articles of incorporation through an amendment to the articles. Under
the 1987 Act, there is no automatic super-majority voting requirement
for amendments to the articles of incorporation.98 Unless the articles of
later, with over 90% of Dataproducts' shares being tendered, followed by a merger.
Former Dataproducts shareholders brought a class action suit against the directors. Their
theory was that Dataproducts' management, by announcing the Hitachi proposal before disclosing
detailed information about the better-than-expected earnings, thereby "capped" the market price
for Dataproducts' stock at $10 per share. In other words, the $10 per share acquisition price
looked better than it would have if the favorable earnings information had been disseminated first.
The shareholders alleged that while the directors had not personally committed the improper acts,
the directors had acquiesced in management's actions and had therefore breached their fiduciary
duty by abdicating their obligations to the shareholders. Similarly, the shareholders argued that
the directors breached their fiduciary duties by transmitting a Schedule 14D-9 that was materially
misleading and designed to induce shareholders to tender at the $10 offering price.
The Delaware Chancery Court held that Dataproducts' director-exculpation charter provision
barred the suit. It viewed the shareholders' claims as stating, at most, a claim of gross negligence
by the directors. In the absence of any allegations that the directors had acted in bad faith or in
breach of their duties of loyalty, the case fell squarely within the scope of conduct for which the
corporation had chosen to exculpate directors from any liability.
97. See, e.g., Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); Principles of Corporate Gov-
ernance § 7.18 (ALl Proposed Final Draft 1992).
98. Cf. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-302(a)(4) (Michie 1991) (1965 Arkansas Business Corpo-
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incorporation or the board of directors raise the voting requirement, the
amendment will be approved if the affirmative votes exceed the nega-
tive votes (assuming a quorum is present). 99 Shares owned or controlled
by the directors who will benefit from the exculpatory clause will, pre-
sumably, be counted, because an amendment to the articles of incorpo-
ration is not a "transaction with the corporation" requiring approval by
only "disinterested shareholders" under the conflict of interest provision
of the 1987 Act.10 And a shareholder who votes against the amend-
ment adding the director-exculpation clause has no dissenters' rights
and cannot force the corporation to buy out his shares, absent a special
provision in the articles, bylaws, or board resolution, 1' 1 or a buy-out
agreement among shareholders.
If the corporation is publicly held, this should not matter too
much, because the unhappy shareholder who has seen the corporation
adopt a director-exculpation clause can simply sell his shares and invest
his money elsewhere. But the vast majority of corporations in Arkansas
are closely held, and there may well be no market for the shares. 102
On balance, it appears that the 1987 Act fails to include sufficient
protection for shareholders in closely held Arkansas corporations.
Those in control of an existing corporation will be able easily to amend
the articles to absolve directors from liability for negligence. This may
be good for business, but if shareholders are to be given a meaningful
choice with respect to the rules of the businesses in which they invest,
ration Act).
99. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-27-1003(E), -725(C) (Michie 1991).
100. Id. § 4-27-831(A), (D).
101. Id. § 4-27-1302(4), (5).
102. For a general discussion of the vulnerability of minority shareholders in closely held
corporations formed under the 1987 Act and strategies to reduce that vulnerability, see Frances
Fendler Rosenzweig, Protecting the Rights of Minority Shareholders in Close Corporations
Under the New Arkansas Business Corporation Act, 44 ARK. L. REV. I (1991).
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the 1987 Act should be amended to provide dissenters' rights to share-
holders who object to the change.103
Frances Fendler Rosenzweig
103. This could be accomplished by adding a new subsection (A)(4)(vi) to section 4-27-
1302, the "right of dissent" section of the 1987 Act. The new subsection might read, "(vi) Adds,
deletes, or amends a provision permitted under § 4-27-202(B)(3) eliminating or limiting the per-
sonal liability of a director."
